Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):351-368 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

For some reason, participants hold agents more responsible for their actions when a situation is described concretely than when the situation is described abstractly. We present examples of this phenomenon, and survey some attempts to explain it. We divide these attempts into two classes: affective theories and cognitive theories. After criticizing both types of theories we advance our novel hypothesis: that people believe that whenever a norm is violated, someone is responsible for it. This belief, along with the familiar workings of cognitive dissonance theory, is enough to not only explain all of the abstract/concrete paradoxes, but also explains seemingly unrelated effects, like the anthropomorphization of malfunctioning inanimate objects.

Author Profiles

David Ripley
Monash University
Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-08-30

Downloads
1,867 (#6,197)

6 months
145 (#27,835)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?