Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Problemos 100:139-151 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence. Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MANKMA
Upload history
Archival date: 2022-03-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-10-16

Total views
143 ( #44,409 of 71,391 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
137 ( #4,538 of 71,391 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.