Type-q materialism

In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group (2008)
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Abstract
s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
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