The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana

Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240 (2017)
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I argue against a class of philosophical views of color perception, especially insofar as such views posit the existence of color sensations. I argue against the need to posit such nonconceptual mental intermediaries between the stimulus and the eventual conceptualized perceptual judgment. Central to my arguments are considerations of certain color illusions. Such illusions are best explained by reference to high-level, conceptualized knowledge concerning, for example, object identity, likely lighting conditions, and material composition of the distal stimulus. Such explanations obviate the need to appeal to nonconceputal mental links in the causal chains eventuating in conceptualized color discriminations.
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Consciousness Explained.Dennett, Daniel C.
Functionalism and Qualia.Shoemaker, Sydney

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Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Brogaard, Berit & Gatzia, Dimitria Electra

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