A puzzle about belief updating

Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160 (2013)
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In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology
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Rational Consensus in Science and Society.Lehrer, Keith & Wagner, Carl

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Disagreement.Matheson, Jonathan & Frances, Bryan

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