Abortion Revisited

In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The three major classical accounts of the morality of abortion are all subject to at least one major problem. Can we do better? This article aims to discuss three accounts that purport to be superior to the classical accounts. First, it discusses the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion. It defends the claim that the future of value argument is superior to all three of the classical accounts. It then goes on to discuss Warren's attempt to fix up her personhood account and David Boonin's attempt to fix up Tooley's desire account. Warren claims that her updated version of a personhood account is superior to any potentiality account, such as the future of value account. The article evaluates her claim. Boonin argues that his improved desire view both deals adequately with the apparent counterexamples to Tooley's original account and also is superior to the future of value account. The article evaluates his views as well.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2009
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARAR-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-02-11
Latest version: 2 (2019-02-11)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-02-01

Total downloads
48 ( #28,413 of 37,119 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #19,090 of 37,119 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.