Concepts, core knowledge, and the rationalism–empiricism debate

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 47:e137 (2024)
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While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that the curse of a compositional mind constitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.

Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield


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