Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis

Philosophy of Science 83 (3):371-392 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver. We show that the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases in which common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial information transfer persists in a *cheap talk* regime, and offer a diagnosis of how this may arise.
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-12-05
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
553 ( #7,724 of 53,009 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #20,294 of 53,009 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.