Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):269-287 (2010)
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Abstract

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.

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Christopher P. Martin
University of Toledo

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