Consciousness in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):269-287 (2007)
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Abstract
Spinoza’s philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza’s account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal byEdwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett
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ISBN(s)
0038-4283
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARCIS-2
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Archival date: 2018-08-23
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2009-01-28

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