Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief

The Monist 96 (3):349-376 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant because it parallels and corroborates well-known worries about natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and religion is genuine or superficial
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
0026-9662
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARDAT-7
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-07-20
Latest version: 2 (2014-11-15)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-09-04

Total views
1,276 ( #1,103 of 38,967 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
191 ( #1,717 of 38,967 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.