Deception in Sender–Receiver Games

Erkenntnis 80 (1):215-227 (2015)
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Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver
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Archival date: 2018-07-22
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Deception: A Functional Account.Artiga, Marc & Paternotte, Cédric

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