Da li su psihološki entiteti istorijski entiteti? (Does Psychological Entities are Historical Entities?)

Godišnjak Filozofskog Fakulteta U Novom Sadu 20:21-29 (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the main and currently dominating attempt in theories of philosophical psychology is the way of describing psychological facts as cognitive state of affairs or mental events which could be individuated by the same means as it were natural species. This idea resulted from incapability of the " folk" psychology to give complete and satisfactory scientific explanation by the intentionality approach. The author claims that many certain advantages of the cognitive theories could be disputable if we try to consistently analyze the ways of describing and individuation of entities in such "deeper" theories. And, especially if we can recognize them as spatiotemporally restricted (i .e. historical) entities. This alternative case could be, as it seems, theoretically more appropriate to their subjects: particular thoughts, believes, desires, representations and other mental events would be individuated as genealogically reconstructed subjects which forms potentially stronger explanatory power than in the case of explanations given by covering laws and in accordance with the presupposition of nomological necessity.

Author's Profile

Vladimir Marko
Comenius University

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-02

Downloads
121 (#77,597)

6 months
66 (#58,208)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?