Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MARGAC-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-12-31
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-12-31

Total views
75 ( #52,298 of 65,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #23,942 of 65,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.