Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

New Ideas in Psychology 61 (21) (2021)
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Abstract
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.
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Archival date: 2020-12-31
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