Navigating Nonidentity

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (1):86-106 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Scanlonian contractualism has difficulties to account for our moral obligations to future generations due to the nonidentity problem. A prominent solution is to refer to the more general standpoints or types of future persons in moral deliberation. This paper critically examines the “types-of-persons approach” and identifies two alternative versions that have been conflated so far. The types-of-persons approach could claim that the relevant reasons for objection are either (a) the reasons of types of persons, or (b) type-based reasons of token persons. I explore these two options in more detail and argue that both are, in their own ways, incompatible with central features of Scanlonian contractualism. Consequently, the types-of-persons approach fails to offer a satisfactory solution to the nonidentity problem for Scanlonian contractualists.

Author's Profile

Desa Valeska Martin
Humboldt University, Berlin

Analytics

Added to PP
n/a

Downloads
41 (#100,717)

6 months
41 (#96,678)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?