Pains as reasons

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
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Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states
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Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative.Martínez, Manolo & Klein, Colin
Recent Work on Pain.Corns, Jennifer

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