Pains as reasons

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
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Abstract
Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states
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MARPAR-9
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Archival date: 2018-07-22
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