Pains as reasons
Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2261-2274 (2015)
Abstract
Imperativism is the view that the phenomenal character of the affective component of pains, orgasms, and pleasant or unpleasant sensory experience depends on their imperative intentional content. In this paper I canvass an imperativist treatment of pains as reason-conferring states
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MARPAR-9
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Archival date: 2018-07-22
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References found in this work BETA
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Millikan, Ruth G.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Tye, Michael
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?Bain, David
A Modern History Theory of Functions.Godfrey-Smith, Peter
Reality and Representation.Papineau, David
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Citations of this work BETA
Why Take Painkillers?Bain, David
Can Evaluativism About Unpleasant Pains Meet the Normative Condition?Mitchell, Jonathan
Recent Work on Pain.Corns, Jennifer
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2014-11-22
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2014-11-22
Total downloads
111 ( #19,970 of 37,193 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #10,536 of 37,193 )
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