Saying, commitment, and the lying – misleading distinction

Journal of Philosophy 119 (12):687-698 (2022)
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How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view.

Author Profiles

Neri Marsili
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
Guido Löhr
Vrije University


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