Does Semantic Deflationism Entail Meta-Ontological Deflationism?

Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):99-119 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them all at once, or do they even entail each other? One exception is Amie Thomasson, who has argued that semantic deflationism actually entails meta-ontological deflationism. This is unexpected, since semantic deflationism is usually regarded as much less controversial than meta-ontological deflationism. In our paper, we will argue that Thomasson’s argument fails though, and that the connection between the views is in fact weaker than she makes them out to be.

Author Profiles

Benjamin Marschall
Cambridge University
Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-26

Downloads
279 (#52,805)

6 months
82 (#45,553)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?