Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism

Erkenntnis 90 (3):1095-1114 (2025)
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Abstract

Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic consequentialism that avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least partially on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive make-up places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long.

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Michal Masny
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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