Making Great-Making Properties Great Again

Dialogue-Journal of Phi Sigma Tau 62 (2-3):144-151 (2020)
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Proponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God typically argue for the existence of a being that has all compossible great-making properties. One such property is necessary existence. If necessary existence cannot be shown to be a great-making property then various modal ontological arguments will fail. Malcom (1960) argues that necessary existence is a great-making property as it entails existing a se which makes it a superior property to contingent existence. I maintain that Malcom’s argument does not succeed since there is nothing that rules out a contingent being, in this case a factually necessary being, from existing a se. Utilizing the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), Bernstein (2014) has argued that necessary existence is a great-making property. I argue that necessary existence is a great making property whether or not the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true.
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Archival date: 2020-11-28
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