On the Possibility of Hallucinations

Mind:fzy088 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question.
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Archival date: 2019-01-09
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References found in this work BETA
The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.

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