“Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account.”

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 116 (2013)
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Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account of the connection between phenomenology and intentionality. It also sheds some light on one of the central themes in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
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