Unity, Mereology and Connectivity

Analysis 74 (3):509-520 (2014)
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The goal of this paper is to raise a few questions about Bayne s mereological account of the unity of consciousness. In Section 1, I raise a few clarificatory questions about the account and the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. In Sections 2 and 3, I offer an alternative view of unity of consciousness and contrast it with Bayne's view. I call this view the connectivity account. These sections prepare the ground for the main question of this article: why should we prefer Bayne's mereological view to the connectivity view?

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Farid Masrour
University of Wisconsin, Madison


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