Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief

In James Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. pp. 139-148 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I explain a challenge to the Equal Weight View coming from the psychology of group inquiry, and evaluate its merits. I argue that while the evidence from the psychology of group inquiry does not give us a reason to reject the Equal Weight View, it does require making some clarifications regarding what the view does and does not entail, as well as a revisiting the ethics of belief.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MATDAT-4
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-01-15
View other versions
Added to PP
2016-01-15

Downloads
314 (#25,879)

6 months
22 (#38,244)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?