Impersonal Value, Universal Value, and the Scope of Cultural Heritage

Ethics 125 (4):999-1027 (2015)
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Abstract
Philosophers have used the terms 'impersonal' and 'personal value' to refer to, among others things, whether something's value is universal or particular to an individual. In this paper, I propose an account of impersonal value that, I argue, better captures the intuitive distinction than potential alternatives, while providing conceptual resources for moving beyond the traditional stark dichotomy. I illustrate the practical importance of my theoretical account with reference to debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage.
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2015
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Archival date: 2015-07-28
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References found in this work BETA
A Theory of Value.Velleman, J. David

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Symbolic Values.Davis, Ryan W.

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2014-09-22

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