Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason

Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):1-16 (2020)
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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinoza’s mereology. In the second half of the paper, I discuss Spinoza’s positive view on mereological composition and present a perspectivalist reading that avoids the interpretive puzzles.
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Archival date: 2020-03-30
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