Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480 (2019)
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In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence.

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Benjamin Matheson
Universitat de Valencia


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