Visual concepts

Philosophical Topics 33 (1):207-233 (2005)
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Abstract
Perceptual content is conceptual. In this paper, some arguments against this thesis are examined and rebutted. The Richness argument, that we could not have concepts for all the colours, is queried: Doesn't the Munsell system give us such concepts? The argument that we can perceive colours and shapes without possessing the relevant concepts is rebutted: we cannot do this, but the kind of concept-possession that is relevant here is not intellectual but perceptual
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0276-2080
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MATVC
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Archival date: 2011-01-25
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Computation and Cognition.Pylyshyn, Zenon W.
Meaning.Grice, H. Paul

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2009-01-28

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