Feynman's Diagrams, Pictorial Representations and Styles of Scientific Thinking

Abstract

In this paper we argue that the different positions taken by Dyson and Feynman on Feynman diagrams’ representational role depend on different styles of scientific thinking. We begin by criticizing the idea that Feynman Diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. We then show that the best interpretation of the role they play in quantum field theory and quantum electrodynamics is captured by Hughes' Denotation, Deduction and Interpretation theory of models (DDI), where “models” are to be interpreted as inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.

Author Profiles

Emanuele Rossanese
Università degli Studi Roma Tre
Mauro Dorato
Università degli Studi Roma Tre

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2017-02-10

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