Abstract

[[THIS IS THE COMPLETE THIRD ISSUE OF MΕTASCIENCE]] This third issue of the journal Mεtascience continues the characterization of this new branch of knowledge that is metascience. If it is new, it is not in a radical sense since Mario Bunge practiced it in an exemplary way, since logical positivists were accused of practicing only a mere metascience, since scientists have always practiced it implicitly, and since some philosophers no longer practice philosophy but rather metascience, but without characterizing it or theorizing it, that is, without realizing that they have abandoned one general discourse for another. The novelty therefore lies in this awareness that a general discourse without philosophy is possible: a scientific general discourse. The ten contributions gathered in this volume illustrate the metascientific approach to knowledge of the world as well as to knowledge of knowledge of the world, that is, science. And like Bunge’s project, they are neither part of the analytical movement nor the continental movement in philosophy. We will read here studies about the Bungean system, some applications of Bungean thought, some metascientific contributions, and some reflections around metascience. Among metascientific disciplines, epistemology occupies a prominent place in this issue of Mεtascience. Metascience differs from philosophy in its rejection of the fundamental philosophical distinction between appearance and reality. Metascientific epistemology therefore does not postulate the existence of any metaphysical reality. But metascientific epistemology, no more than philosophical ontology, is a factual science. The first, because it studies scientific constructs and not concrete objects, the second, because it is interested in transcendent or metaphysical objects.