Induction and scientific realism: Einstein versus Van Fraassen: Part two: Aim-oriented empiricism and scientific essentialism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101 (1993)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities.

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Nicholas Maxwell
University College London

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