What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?

Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31 (2015)
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Abstract

For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny.

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Nicholas Maxwell
University College London

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