Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning

Abstract

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

Author Profiles

Conor Mayo-Wilson
University of Washington
Gregory Wheeler
Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management

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