Linguistic intuition and calibration

Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (5):443-460 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentences as a key source of evidence for their theories. While widespread, this methodology has also been controversial. In this paper, I develop a positive account of linguistic intuition, and defend its role in linguistic inquiry. Intuitions qualify as evidence as form of linguistic behavior, which, since it is partially caused by linguistic competence (the object of investigation), can be used to study this competence. I defend this view by meeting two challenges. First, that intuitions are collected through methodologically unsound practices, and second, that intuition cannot distinguish between the contributions of competence and performance systems.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MAYLIA
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-01-18
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-12-05

Total views
1,272 ( #3,333 of 2,448,790 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #20,137 of 2,448,790 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.