Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273 (2010)
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Abstract

In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these results, one must develop a better conception of the connection between a subject's interests and her body of knowledge than those offered by Stanley and Schaffer.

Author Profiles

Joshua May
University of Alabama, Birmingham
Aaron Zimmerman
University of California at Santa Barbara

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