Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359 (2013)
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Abstract
Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven’t argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes’ deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not a promising avenue for moral skeptics to take. They’re ultimately weaker when applied to morality compared to perception.
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2013
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First archival date: 2013-10-08
Latest version: 3 (2013-12-13)
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Epistemology.Feldman, Richard

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2013-10-05

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