Death and prudential deprivation

Pense (Edinb.) 1:29–41 (2020)
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Abstract

Dying is (sometimes) bad for the dier because it prevents her from being the subject of wellbeing she otherwise would (the deprivation account). I argue for this from a (plausible) principle about which futures are bad for a prudential subject (the future-comparison principle). A strengthening of this principle yields that death is not always bad, and that the badness of death does not consist in that it destroys the dier.

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Matthew W. G. McClure
Cambridge University

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