Functionalism and self-consciousness

Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than hers. (Bealer’s reply to this paper appears in the same issue of Mind & Language.)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MCCFAS
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
118 ( #19,174 of 37,126 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #28,840 of 37,126 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.