The priority view

Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57 (2017)
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According to the priority view, or prioritarianism, it matters more to benefit people the worse off they are. But how exactly should the priority view be defined? This article argues for a highly general characterization which essentially involves risk, but makes no use of evaluative measurements or the expected utility axioms. A representation theorem is provided, and when further assumptions are added, common accounts of the priority view are recovered. A defense of the key idea behind the priority view, the priority principle, is provided. But it is argued that the priority view fails on both ethical and conceptual grounds.
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Archival date: 2016-09-21
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Reasons and Persons.Margolis, Joseph

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Probability in Ethics.McCarthy, David
Distributive Equality.McCarthy, David
Prioritarianism: A Response to Critics.Adler, Matthew D. & Holtug, Nils

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