Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias

In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), Introduction to Implicit Bias. New York, NY, USA: pp. 174-190 (2020)
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A topic of special importance when it comes to responsibility and implicit bias is responsibility for knowledge. Are there strategies for becoming more responsible and respectful knowers? How might we work together, not just as individuals but members of collectives, to reduce the negative effects of bias on what we see and believe, as well as the wrongs associated with epistemic injustice? To explore these questions, Chapter 9 introduces the concept of epistemic responsibility, a set of practices developed through the cultivation of basic epistemic virtues, such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and diligence that help knowers seek information about themselves, others, and the world.
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Archival date: 2020-07-24
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