Conjuring Ethics from Words

Noûs 49 (1):71-93 (2012)
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Abstract

Many claims about conceptual matters are often represented as, or inferred from, claims about the meaning, reference, or mastery, of words. But sometimes this has led to treating conceptual analysis as though it were nothing but linguistic analysis. We canvass the most promising justifications for moving from linguistic premises to substantive conclusions. We show that these justifications fail and argue against current practice (in metaethics and elsewhere), which confuses an investigation of a word’s meaning, reference, or competence conditions with an analysis of some concept or property associated with that word.

Author Profiles

Aness Kim Webster
Durham University
Glen Pettigrove
University of Glasgow

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