Epistemic contextualism defended

Synthese 192 (2):363-383 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression ‘knows’ depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that ‘knows’ is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the ‘disagreement problem’, which concerns the behaviour of ‘knows’ in disagreement reports. These may not be the only objections to epistemic contextualism, but they are probably the most influential. I argue that the best current epistemic contextualist response to the linguistic objection is incomplete, and I show how it can be supplemented to deal with the full range of linguistic objections. I also develop a new solution to the disagreement problem. The upshot is that neither sort of objection gives us any reason to reject epistemic contextualism. This conclusion is, in a sense, negative—no new arguments for epistemic contextualism are advanced—but it’s a vital step towards rehabilitating the view
Categories
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MCKECD
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-11-04
Latest version: 2 (2017-05-09)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-11-04

Total views
321 ( #8,165 of 38,085 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #13,696 of 38,085 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.