No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’

Logos and Episteme 9 (3):335-342 (2018)
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Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all women in the extension of the concept ‘woman.’ I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts—and social kind concepts in general—is not to represent the world, but rather to shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for “conceptual engineering” in philosophy more generally. While Haslanger’s account may escape Simion’s objection, other appeals to conceptual engineering might not fair so well.
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MCKNET-3
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Archival date: 2018-10-22
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2018-10-16

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