Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority

In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. pp. 97--116 (2003)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.<sup>1</sup> One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-01-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Epistemic Operators.Dretske, Fred I.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
296 ( #15,189 of 50,252 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #16,580 of 50,252 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.