Motion and the Affection Argument

Synthese 195 (11):4979-4995 (2018)
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In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant presents an argument for the centrality of <motion> to our concept <matter>. This argument has long been considered either irredeemably obscure or otherwise defective. In this paper I provide an interpretation which defends the argument’s validity and clarifies the sense in which it aims to show that <motion> is fundamental to our conception of matter.

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Colin McLear
University of Nebraska, Lincoln


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