Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds

In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what I call the Expressive Hypothesis. The Expressive Hypothesis is intuitive. But in this chapter I argue that it does not allow us to do away with the thought that we sometimes perceive people's mental states. I take my arguments to provide some tentative support for the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis.

Author's Profile

William E. S. McNeill
University of Southampton


Added to PP

602 (#27,257)

6 months
106 (#40,759)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?