Impermissive Bayesianism

Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217 (2013)
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Abstract
This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s arguments against permissive views do not succeed.
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2014
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MEAIB-2
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First archival date: 2013-05-13
Latest version: 2 (2013-10-13)
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2013-05-13

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