Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
Synthese 198 (8):7309-7349 (2020)
Abstract
Theories that use expected utility maximization to evaluate acts have difficulty handling cases with infinitely many utility contributions. In this paper I present and motivate a way of modifying such theories to deal with these cases, employing what I call “Direct Difference Taking”. This proposal has a number of desirable features: it’s natural and well-motivated, it satisfies natural dominance intuitions, and it yields plausible prescriptions in a wide range of cases. I then compare my account to the most plausible alternative, a proposal offered by Arntzenius :31–58, 2014). I argue that while Arntzenius’s proposal has many attractive features, it runs into a number of problems which Direct Difference Taking avoids.
Categories
Reprint years
2021
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MEATMO-8
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-13
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-12-13
Total views
328 ( #24,047 of 71,140 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #23,671 of 71,140 )
2019-12-13
Total views
328 ( #24,047 of 71,140 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
35 ( #23,671 of 71,140 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.