Two mistakes regarding the principal principle

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivals

Author's Profile

Christopher J. G. Meacham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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