Understanding Conditionalization

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797 (2015)
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Abstract
At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions of Conditionalization to choose from. And which version we choose has interesting ramifications, bearing on issues such as whether Conditionalization can handle continuous evidence, and whether Jeffrey Conditionalization is really a generalization of Conditionalization
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2015
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Archival date: 2015-11-25
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
.Butterfield, Jeremy & Earman, John
Knowledge and Its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Don’T Stop Believing.Carr, Jennifer Rose

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2015-11-25

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